DIGITAL ARCHIPELAGO

Stability of International Environmental Agreements: heterogeneity, rationality and dynamic analysis

Environment | European and International Studies | Conservation Biology

2004

The aim of this research is to analyse the stability and reach of International Environmental Agreements (IEA) such as the Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol) or the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer.

DIRECTOR

Santiago José Rubio Jorge

RESEARCH TEAM

Begoña Casino Martínez, Mª Dolores Alepuz Chaqués.

COLLABORATING INSTITUTIONS

Universidad de Valencia

DESCRIPTION

The research seeks to progress in the study of IEA stability using analysis tools drawn from games theory. The first is a simultaneous game around a free-access agreement with heterogeneous countries, assuming that the environmental deterioration suffered by each depends on its aggregate emissions (flow variable).

This will allow us to examine how different rules on the share-out of cooperation gains affect the reach or scope of IEAs. A second stage of the investigation considers the impact of threshold clauses for participation and how to optimise their level. Finally, we will apply a dynamic analysis of IEA stability in two directions: running a sequential coalition-forming game and a (dynamic) game on different coalition-forming outcomes.